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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
Asking the question of whether to adopt or reject complex and controversial technologies 
(CCT) has become a necessary aspect of life for consumers. Modern life has become 
progressively more complex, bringing with it the rise of an increasingly complicated web of 
new technology. New technologies may take several forms; they may be rather innocuous, 
included as a part of a larger technology (such as faster computer processor chip) or they 
may be innocuous and stand alone as a separate technology (e.g., a sonic toothbrush). A 
new technology might also be perceived to be hazardous. A popular and well known 
example is nuclear energy technology, which has shown great potential as an inexpensive 
source of electrical power, but which has found great resistance from the public. Because of 
concerns about the potential for disaster, regardless of the diminutive odds of a nuclear 
disaster actually occurring, nuclear energy has found limited use in the United States. 
The above example brings to light an interesting set of questions. One question relates 
to the seeming discrepancy between the objective hazards (reported by industry or 
governmental experts) associated with a CCT, and the public's subjective perspective of the 
potential for the hazard to become a disaster. Experts who assess the potential hazards 
associated with a technology and communicate those potentialities to the public often are 
frustrated by what they perceive to be an uneducated, unintelligent, irresponsible, or 
irrational public (Freudenburg, 1996; Bradbury, 1989; Foster, Bernstein & Huber, 1993; 
Gross & Levitt, 1994; Beckmann, 1973). If experts argue a technology is safe, yet the public 
still rejects it, the question of perception becomes vital to an understanding of risk. What 
then, are the factors that influence the public's opinions about CCT's? The second question 
raised by the nuclear power example above is related to the theoretical implications of the 
adoption or rejection of CCT's. What theoretical perspective(s) can be used to understand 
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the relationship between an innovative, complex, and controversial technology and its 
adoption or rejection by the public? 
Three theoretical perspectives have been advanced to explain public responses to 
complex technologies. Risk theorists suggest that individual decisions regarding technology 
are shaped by cognitive perceptions of objective hazards on the one hand and social 
influences, such as norms, values and trust on the other (e.g., Bradbury, 1989; Lupton, 
1999). Group polarization theorists (Stoner, 1961) suggest that in ambiguous or novel 
situations where attitudes are underdeveloped group attitudes tend to be more extreme after 
group discussion than the mean of the individual attitudes held prior to the interaction (e.g., 
Myers & Lamm, 1976). Diffusion of innovations theorists (Rogers, 1995) describe the 
process of the adoption or rejection of an innovative technology or idea, suggesting that 
normative attitudes of the group are developed, changed, or influenced by opinion leaders. 
Each of these theories provides an important perspective from which to understand 
consumer opinions of CCT's, and each has advantages specific to the theory. Bisk theory 
provides a macro-social view of risk, providing a framework to understand the nature of 
technology in historical context. The group polarization effect predicts a polarizing effect 
should take place among the individuals within a group after discussion about the 
technology has taken place, stating that the direction of the choice shift should reflect the 
group's valued norm regarding the technology. This process could be problematic for 
predicting adoption/rejection of a new technology because the norm regarding the 
innovation may not yet be fully developed. Rogers' (1995) predicts the answer to the 
question of directionality of the choice shift in the innovation-diffusion model. A shift can be 
expected in the direction of the attitudes of trusted opinion leaders. 
Consumer's opinions regarding CCT's are themselves quite complex. The question of 
how beliefs, attitudes, and norms are developed related to these novel technologies and 
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how those beliefs, attitudes and norms affect acceptance of the technology are essential in 
developing an understanding of consumer opinion and in understanding how related 
theories function under conditions of ambiguity. This thesis will use the theories mentioned 
to examine alternative perspectives and develop a better understanding of consumer 
opinions of two specific examples of CCT's; biotechnology and food irradiation. 
Thesis Organization 
In examining the factors related to an understanding of consumer's opinions of CCT's, 
this thesis contains two research manuscripts. This chapter provides a general introduction 
to the issues associated with consumer opinions of CCT's and a literature review of the 
relevant theoretical perspectives (risk analysis, polarization theory, and Rogers' diffusion of 
innovation theory). Each chapter will have its own reference section; therefore it is likely 
that there will be redundancies among the chapter reference sections. 
Chapter two is a manuscript entitled, "A Comparison of Two Approaches to 
Understanding Consumer Opinions of Biotechnology" (Titchener & Sapp, in press). This 
paper examines factors associated with the intent to eat genetically modified food. It is 
informed by two theoretical perspectives of risk; a cognitive-science/technical perspective 
(Bradbury, 1989; Lupton, 1999; Titchener & Sapp, in press), which views risk as a 
quantifiable, objective or psychometric phenomenon, and a sociocultural perspective 
(Bradbury, 1989; Lupton, 1999), which argues that risk is a socially-constructed 
phenomenon that cannot be understood solely as a calculable potentiality of hazards. 
Findings show that, while cognitive factors such as perceived nutrition, perceived safety, 
and perceived benefits are important indicators of willingness to eat genetically modified 
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foods, so too are sociocultural factors such as trust in scientists, perceived social 
acceptability and perceived ethical legitimacy. 
Chapter three is a manuscript entitled, "A Longitudinal Examination of Consumer 
Opinions of Food Irradiation." This paper considers consumer opinions of food irradiation 
technology across time from two theoretical perspectives; the group polarization 
phenomenon (Stoner, 1961; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Lamm, 1976), and 
Rogers' diffusion of innovation theory (Rogers, 1995). The data show that in ambiguous or 
novel situations a polarization of attitudes toward the new technology can be expected in the 
direction of the attitudes and beliefs of opinion leaders. 
Chapter four provides a general discussion of the findings across the two research 
manuscripts. Recommendations for future research will be discussed in relation to current 
trends in the literature. 
Literature Review 
The literature review contains three sections. The first describes the technologies 
selected as subject matter for investigation of explanations of consumer risk perceptions. 
Two technologies were selected for study: genetically modified food and food irradiation. 
Each technology has been the focus of heated debate between proponents and opponents, 
with public discourse about genetically modified food (as a specific topic) and biotechnology 
(more generally) receiving more attention in the mass media. The second section reviews 
literature on the theoretical perspectives used in the two research manuscripts. 
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Complex and Controversial Agricultural Technologies 
The genetic modification of food refers to the transfer of selected genes from one 
species of plant or animal to the cell of another plant or animal for the purpose of improving 
the performance of the host species. Public discourse about biotechnology and genetically 
modified food has received much media attention since the mid-1990's. Food & Drink 
Weekly (F&DW, June 26, 2000) cites an Angus Reid Group poll of American and Canadian 
opinions of biotechnology, stating that while many are aware of biotechnology (65% of 
Americans and 79% of Canadians), few had at least some knowledge about it (4% of 
Americans and 5% of Canadians claimed to know "a lot" about biotechnology). The article 
suggests that consumers have not decided whether biotechnology is a scientific boon, and 
many have expressed concerns about health and safety issues (F&DW, 2000). Other polls, 
however, have shown a somewhat more positive outlook for biotech foods. An International 
Food Information Council (IFIC) survey in February, 1999, found that American consumers 
had a relatively positive regard for biotechnology, finding that 75% believed they would 
benefit from biotechnology within the next five years. Additionally, the IFIC survey found 
that issues relating to the benefits of biotech food were important indicators of acceptance; 
62% said they would purchase biotech food if the food was made tastier and fresher and 
77% claimed they would purchase if the food reduced the use of pesticides by making the 
food more insect resistant. The survey did, however, also find that consumers felt strongly 
regarding the labeling of genetically modified organisms (GMO's); 69% of respondents 
reported they agreed with the FDA's labeling policy, and 86% stated they would be in favor 
of more information being provided about biotech foods (brochures, web sites, toll-free 
numbers) in addition to current labeling policy. Other public opinion polls have mirrored this 
desire of the consumer to be informed about whether her/his food is a GMO through the use 
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of labeling. The Center for Food Safety (CFS, 2001) compiled numerous poll results 
regarding GMO foods, finding a great deal of support for being informed about GMO foods 
through labeling. 
Industry concerns about the public's opinion of these technologies are not without merit. 
The European market has consistently opposed the adoption of GMO's and biotechnology 
in general. A CBS news article (2000) highlights this concern, stating that Europe has 
termed biotech foods "Frankenfoods" and has gone as far as to ban them from thousands of 
stores and torn up fields planted with biotech crops. Gary Goldberg, CEO of the American 
Corn Growers Association (ACGA) suggests that is it unlikely that European consumers are 
going to accept GMO's any time soon, and that American farmers will need to segregate 
their crops and sell only non-GMO crops to European consumers (PR Newswire, 2000). 
Although it seems unlikely that American sentiment will turn away from biotech foods as 
strongly as has been found in Europe, safety concerns may result in resistance to total 
adoption of GMO's in America. Indeed, safety concerns peaked when Starlink corn, which 
is genetically modified to be insect resistant and has not been approved for human 
consumption (only for livestock consumption), was found mixed with corn meant for human 
consumption (Meredith Corp., 2001 ). Events such as the Starlink scandal could easily lead 
to heightened awareness of safety concerns among consumers and result in rejection, in 
whole or part, of the technology. 
Food irradiation involves exposing food to ionizing radiation in low doses to kill 
foodborne microorganisms that cause food to spoil and cause disease (Greenberg, 1996; 
Henkel, 1998; CDC, 1999; Olson, 1998). Because of the type of radiation used in the 
process (e.g., cobalt, cesium, high-energy electrons, gamma rays or X-rays) the food does 
not become radioactive (Greenberg, 1996; CDC, 1999). Proponents of food irradiation 
assert the technology is safe and does not significantly alter the nutritional value of the food 
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(CDC, 1999). While food irradiation is considered a new technology, it has a history that 
reaches back to 1958 when it was approved for testing by the FDA. Since that time, it has 
been approved by forty countries and adopted successfully by 27 countries as of November 
1995 (Greenberg, 1996). 
Not everyone agrees that irradiated food is a safe technology. Opponents of food 
irradiation suggest this technology presents a much larger potential health hazard than 
experts suggest. Food & Water, Inc. (2000), for example, claims radiation used to sterilize 
food alters the molecular structure of the food, resulting in potentially harmful by-products 
and reduced nutritional value. Food & Water, Inc. argues that many studies proclaiming the 
safety and value of food irradiation are suspect and even flawed (2000). Opponents also 
point to resistance in consumer attitudes toward irradiated food and public concerns about 
the technology (Food & Water, 2000). There is evidence to suggest that consumers are 
cautious in their acceptance of irradiated food. Stores and markets carrying beef treated 
with irradiation, for example, have experienced slow sales and some have stopped stocking 
the product altogether (Sasso, 2000). It seems like adoption of irradiated food is not a given 
eventuality, and irradiated food's fate is still uncertain. 
If it is possible that consumers could reject a new CCT regardless of the assurances of 
experts that it is safe, then developing an understanding of how consumer opinions of 
complex and controversial technologies are developed is important not only to those 
interested in the commerce of CCT's, but also of great interest to social scientific 
communities, which search for factors that predict human social behavior. It is, therefore, 
appropriate and meaningful to examine the literature for theories that can explain how 
consumer opinions of CCT's are formed and how these opinions might be predicted. 
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Theoretical Approaches to Risk 
Risk Theory 
In ancient times, through the dark ages, the Renaissance, and early into the 
Enlightenment, humans struggled with the reasons why disasters happened to them, their 
families, their villages, or their countries. It was generally believed that when bad things 
happened, it was somehow due to supernatural forces (Bernstein, 1998). With the dawn of 
scientific discovery, however, it become accepted that events could be traced to more 
earthly causes. Additionally, the boom of industry and evolution of medical technology had 
dramatic effects on the conception of risk, e.g., lowered infant mortality rates, increased life 
expectancy through nutrition, and curing and treating previously deadly diseases. 
Ulrich Beck (1992, 1999) argues that the industrial revolution brought with it a promise 
that modernization would make for a better world, wherein nature and disease could be 
controlled and full employment could be achieved. He states that this optimistic attitude, 
associated with Enlightenment philosophy, or the first modernity, did not last. The 
"radicalized modernization" that took place in the first modernization led to unanticipated 
consequences associated with the very technologies that were supposed to liberate 
humankind. Beck points to five processes that have undermined the first modernity; 
globalization, individualization, the gender revolution, underemployment and global risks (as 
ecological crisis and the crash of the global financial markets). These undermining 
processes have led to what Beck calls a "reflexive second modernity," a modernity turned 
back on itself in reaction to the unintended consequences of the first industrial modernity. 
Risk becomes, in this second modernity, a global issue that must be dealt with and has both 
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constructivist (risk as a socially constructed phenomenon) and realist (risk as an objective 
and calculable) facets. 
Beck (1999) emphasizes eight key aspects of the second modernity. First, risks are not 
synonymous with disaster, but are rather the threat of disaster. Risks then, are virtual in 
nature; that is, in the process of potentially becoming real. According to this perspective, 
while objective hazards do exist, risk is defined by the cultural perception of risk. Second, 
the virtual nature of risk has led to the perception of unknowable possible future events 
determining present action. People discuss and debate as to what may be rather than what 
really is a risk. Society thereby runs the risk of becoming overly politicized by the potentiality 
of disaster. Third, risks are both factual in nature as well as value statements. Risks are 
factual in the sense they can represent a mathematical probability. Mortality rates for 
automobile accidents make it possible for individual risk to be computed, for example. But if 
a culture places high value on mobility and independence it will likely define driving as an 
acceptable risk. Beck points out that this duality of risk requires that risk be understood as 
an interdisciplinary issue; potential hazards cannot be fully understood except in the context 
of knowledge of cultural perceptions and norms. 
The fourth key aspect of the risk society is that the nation-state's defined purpose is to 
create and maintain order and control, which, of course, are threatened by the undermining 
nature of the unintended consequences that define risk in the second modernity. Thus, risk 
can be conceived as physical, empirical evidence (such as deaths from airplane crashes), or 
as "unawareness," which involves not-yet-known or potential risk. This second type of risk is 
potentially hazardous for society because it is based on threats to order and control, turning 
everyday life into "an involuntary lottery of misfortune" (Beck, 1999: 139) 
Beck, in his sixth point, states that the distinction between the local and the global is 
meaningless in a world risk society. Risks arising from the unintended consequences of the 
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industrial modernization of the first modernity are often global in nature because threats do 
not have defined boundaries. Beck's seventh point draws a distinction between knowledge 
about a risk and its effect. Given the global nature of risk in the second modernity, the point 
of origin of a risk is not necessarily its point of impact. Eighth, Beck points out that the 
industrialization of both nature and culture, as well as the fact that hazards in the second 
modernity affect both humans and nature, have had the effect of a "Joss of clear distinction 
between nature and culture" (ibid.:145). In the second modernity, the dichotomous 
nature/culture structure of thought, discussed by theorists such as Goffman (1974), is now 
more a blended, hybrid world of the two. 
Beck's concept of risk implies an opportunity for action. Because risk exists after trust 
ends, but before a disaster strikes, the implication is that knowledge of potential hazards (as 
well as correctly defining the risk) is key to any action that might be taken. Beck's 
perspective suggests a multi-disciplinary approach to risk analysis and communication, 
placing emphasis on both the subjective (constructionist) and the objective (realist) factors 
of risk. Most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, Beck's risk theory would predict that 
both cognitive-science factors and sociocultural factors would be important to the 
acceptance or adoption of a CCT. 
Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991), like Beck, focuses on reactions to modern life and 
technological 'progress' whose promises of a better life for humanity led instead to 
unintended consequences of modernity. Late modernity (the equivalent of Beck's second 
modernity}, according to Giddens, is characterized by three "dynamic forces of modernity": 
reflexivity related to individuals as well as institutions, a separation of time and space, and 
disembedding mechanisms, which remove social relations from their context in time and 
space and expand them to larger settings (1990; 1991). Knowledge provided by experts 
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falls into this category, according to Giddens, because it is applicable apart from those who 
use the knowledge (1991). 
Modernity, according to Giddens (1990; 1991 ), provides a unifying effect not seen prior 
to modernity. In pre-modern times, tradition and activities were highly localized and 
fragmented. Modernity allowed for the ability to associate with others who were not present 
physically and a sense of global 'we-ness' developed. In pre-modern times, localized life 
also meant localized trust, which stems from what Giddens refers to as ontological security, 
or the sense that the world has continuity and can be trusted to remain reliable. Giddens 
(1990) identifies four localized contexts of trust that separate pre-modern from modern life. 
The first context refers to the kinship system; which allow people in pre-modern times to 
organize relationships into what Giddens refers to as "bundles of social relations across time 
and space." The second localized context is the local community. In pre-modern times, the 
sense of community was intrinsically linked to place, physically localized in time and space. 
Giddens points out that although some individuals and groups moved about in pre-modern 
times, the majority of populations were relatively immobile. A third context of trust in pre-
modern times relates to what Giddens refers to as religious cosmologies or sets of religious 
beliefs that allowed persons to construct interpretations of nature and life that give them a 
sense of stability and ontological security. The fourth context of trust is tradition, which 
provided a means for people to connect the past to the present as well as provide 
organization for the future. 
Giddens argues that in modernity these four contexts of trust have been altered. Kinship 
relations have been replaced by personal relationships based on friendship or sexual 
relations as a stabilizing force for social ties. The local community of pre-modern times is 
replaced in modernity by abstract systems to stabilize modernity's distanced time/space 
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relations. The third and forth contexts of trust and tradition are replaced in modernity by a 
future-oriented way of thinking. 
Giddens suggests several ways in which the concept of risk has changed from pre-
modern times to modernity. Dangers and hazards in pre-modern times originated in nature. 
In modernity, by contrast, dangers and hazards arise from the reflexivity of modernity itself. 
Giddens' points out that in pre-modern times danger arose primarily from human 
aggression. In modernity, however, violent threat from humans arises from the 
industrialization of war. In pre-modern times there was a risk of falling from religious grace 
or being cursed by a magical source. Modernity, by contrast, involves the "threat of 
personal meaninglessness deriving from the reflexivity of modernity as applied to the self' 
In modernity, Giddens argues most risks consist of human-made risk based on knowledge 
of potential hazards. 
Implicit in both the perspectives of Beck and Giddens is a presumption that there are 
objective hazards 'out there' whether these hazards are known by the public or not. Not 
everyone agrees that this is a meaningful way to consider risk. After all, the idea of risk 
suggests only a potential hazard that may never come to fruition. In this way, risk 
assessment is seen by some as not far removed from fortune telling, except a computer 
replaces the crystal ball. Those who suggest risk is subjective in nature point out that many 
potential hazards deemed 'highly risky' by experts are often ignored in the public arena, 
while many hazards labeled 'low risk' by experts are viewed as too risky and rejected by the 
public (Douglas, 1985; 1992; Bradbury, 1989; Freudenburg, 1996; with Rursch, 1994; with 
Pastor, 1992; Sandman, 1987; Lupton, 1999). Very often those who propose an objective 
perspective of risk suggest individuals are akin to risk calculators, rationally estimating 
objective risks and making decisions based upon their calculations. Proponents of a 
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subjective view of risk suggest that risk identification and estimation do not involve a value-
free process, but rather are socially constructed. 
Much debate has arisen from the issue of the public's skepticism relating to expert 
assessment of risk. The cognitive-science perspective posits a rational view of risk, arguing 
that individuals are naturally risk-aversive and that engaging in known risky behavior is 
therefore irrational (Douglas, 1985; Bloor, 1995). Those in technical fields tend to owe the 
rejection of their expert judgments to a public that mistrusts institutional and government 
assessments of risk (Bradbury, 1989). Much of the research in the technico-scientific 
branch of the cognitive-science field focuses on ways to overcome ill-informed or incorrect 
public opinion, often by facilitating better communication between institutions and the public 
(Bradbury, 1989; Brown, 1989). At times, the technico-scientific view of public opinion 
suggests an "ill-masked contempt for lay people's lack of what is deemed to be 'appropriate' 
or 'correct' knowledge about risk" (Lupton, 1999:19). The public has been described in 
academic journals and books as irrational and the media as irresponsible in an effort to 
place blame away from scientific experts and industry leaders (Freudenburg, 1996). 
Scientists have gone as far as to tag public skepticism with such labels as "phantom risk" 
(Foster et al., 1993), "higher superstition" (Gross & Levitt, 1994) and "eco-hysterics" and 
"technophobes" (Beckmann, 1973). Psychometric studies, for example, seek to determine 
how individuals react cognitively to objectively accepted hazards. Among the factors which 
have been found to be related to risk perceptions are: perceived safety (Fischhoff, Slovic, 
Lichtenstein, Read & Combs, 1978; Sparks & Shepherd, 1994), perceived benefit (Fischhoff 
et al, 1978), worry (Sjoberg, 1998), belief that zero risk is possible (Nakayachi, 1998), 
environmental beliefs (O'Connor, Bord & Fisher, 1999), knowledge of risk (Bord & O'Connor, 
1992; 1990; Sandman, Miller, Johnson & Weinstein, 1993), agency communication 
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(Sandman, et al, 1993), community outrage (Sandman, et al, 1993), and intended mitigation 
(Sandman, Weinstein & Miller, 1994). 
Because the nature of risk is accepted as given, it is not surprising that a question that 
does not get asked by technical experts is one relating to how risk is constructed as a social 
fact (Lupton, 1999: 18). Cultural values almost certainly influence the ways in which risk is 
socially negotiated. Furthermore, values exist not only in the public lay-person, but also in 
the scientific community--guiding research, defining the questions asked, deciding which 
research gets published and which does not, and whose findings make their way into the 
public consciousness. Although most who work in the technico-scientific field of risk 
assessment would not suggest their work is value-free, findings and calculations related to 
risk are treated as though they are. Given that values play a part in the assessment, 
communication, and policy decisions made regarding risks, as well as the perceptions of 
risks by the public, the assumption that the public is not rational in its judgments about risks 
or that it is ignorant or obtuse, seems ill-placed. 
Thus, the sociocultural perspective argues that both the expert and the lay person have 
a perception of risk that exists in a contextual frame of social and cultural influences. All 
knowledge related to risk, whether a claim to knowledge by an expert or by the public, 
occurs within a social framework, guided by norms and values. The social constructionist 
perspective is not totally unified in its viewpoint with regard to the ways in which risk is 
conceived. Within this perspective, conceptualization of risk falls along a continuum from 
risk as an objective fact, mediated by social factors, to risk as a completely socially 
constructed phenomenon (Lupton, 1999). For theorists who propose the latter view, that 
risk is entirely socially constructed, "nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But 
on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, 
considers the event" (Ewald, 1991: 199). In practice, however, much of the literature deals 
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with risk more as a socially constructed interpretation of objective hazards, using these 
objective hazards as the baseline in which socially constructed perceptions of risk are 
compared. Siegrist, Cvetkovich and Roth (2000), for example, found people's self reported 
trust in decision makers along with salient value similarity and risk versus benefit perception 
influenced how risk perceptions related to technology are developed in democratic 
countries. At the same time, Siegrist (2000) examined the effects of trust in institutions and 
perceived benefit/risk of the technology, finding trust in institutions had an indirect effect on 
the acceptance of biotechnology, mediated by perceived benefit and perceived risk of the 
technology. Peters, Covello and McCallum (1997) examined the determinants of trust and 
credibility as it relates to risk communication, finding that perceptions of trust and credibility 
were mainly the result of respondent's perceptions of the knowledge and expertise of the 
source, their perceptions of the communicator's openness and honesty, and their 
perceptions of the communicator's concern and care. 
Factors other than trust have also been investigated in the literature. Savage (1993) 
found that women, those with less education and income, the young, and blacks report 
feeling more dread about perceived risks than others. The author suggests that the findings 
are most likely due to the perceived personal exposure to the hazard than, say, a lack of 
education. Gender differences, however, have been found to be an unclear distinction in 
the literature on risk perception. Gustafson (1998) found discrepancies between findings of 
quantitative and qualitative methodological techniques--when gender differences are found, 
they are either not explained or not explained well with existing theories of gender. 
Bord and O'Conner (1990) examined factors relating to food irradiation and perceived 
risk, testing attitudes, knowledge, background characteristics, and the risk message 
characteristics as influences for respondent acceptance of irradiated food. They found that 
normative/value factors were more influential than were rational/technical/cognitive factors. 
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Furthermore, it was found that while cognitive factors such as knowledge were correlated 
with acceptance of food irradiation, factors indicating trust were better and more powerful 
predictors of acceptance. Grobe, Douthitt and Zepeda (1999) examined the outrage factors 
(the subjective aspects of a risk) associated with consumer opinions of biotech foods 
(specifically recombinant bovine growth hormone). They found that outrage factors 
mediated consumer's risk perceptions. In an examination of socioeconomic factors relating 
to food safety and risk perceptions, Dosman, Adamowicz and Hrudey (2001) found that 
gender, voting preferences, age, number of children and household income were all 
predictive of risk perceptions about food safety. 
Efforts have been made to reconcile the division between the cognitive-science 
perspective, which has been criticized for its reductionist and realist conceptualization of risk 
(Freudenburg, 1996; Bradbury, 1989; Lupton, 1999), and the sociocultural perspective, 
which is in need of direction and further research. Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, Brown, Emel, 
Goble, Kasperson and Ratick (1988), for example, argue that social amplification of risk, or 
"the process of intensifying or attenuating signals during the transmission of information 
from an information source, to intermediate transmitters, and finally to a receiver" (p. 179) 
might help explain discrepancies between the expert's view and the public's view as errors 
that occur in the communication process between the expert's "true" and "factual" 
perspective and the flawed perspective of the public. 
To test the cognitive-science and sociocultural perspectives together, one must avoid 
these reified assumptions and instead examine the different contributions of factors from 
each perspective. It can be presumed, for example, that a measure of acceptance can 
indirectly measure a level of risk; if an individual reports she intends to purchase or use the 
technology, she most likely believes the benefits of the technology outweigh the risks of 
disaster. While this argument assumes a rational actor, little prediction could be made 
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regarding the social construction of risk otherwise. And with this assumption it may be 
possible to determine which factors best predict the measure of acceptance of the CCT. In 
chapter two, these factors will be examined to determine if technical/cognitive, sociocultural 
factors or all three best explain consumer's intention to purchase genetically modified foods. 
Group Polarization Theory 
Prior to the early 1960's it was generally believed that the opinion of a group was 
approximately equal to the average of individual opinions of its members. This made sense 
to researchers at the time because much of the knowledge of group norms and conformity 
studies in the 1950's and before suggested group members' opinions converged on a 
normative position (ex., Festinger, 1953; Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1936). Traditional belief would 
predict, for example, that if department faculty members were making decisions regarding 
the curriculum for the next year, their diverse opinions brought together and discussed 
would result in an opinion that reflected the middle ground of the group. 
This assumption was challenged when Stoner (1961) found that instead of making group 
decisions that were the average of the individual opinions, the group made decisions that 
were more risky than the initial group average. Stoner's description of this 'risky shift' 
phenomenon was later revised by others who found that while shifts did occur, they were 
not necessarily in the direction of more risk, but were sometimes toward less risk (for 
example, see Fraser, Gouge & Billig, 1971; Stoner, 1968). Subsequent research found that 
the direction of shift occurred in response to opinions of the "favored group norm" that arose 
in the process of group discussion. Thus, shift from the initial mean group opinion toward a 
more extreme opinion in the direction of the favored group norm became known as group 
polarization. 
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While in laboratory experiments the polarization phenomenon seemed robust, in field 
experiments findings were mixed. In some natural groups, no polarization was discovered 
(Semin & Glendon, 1973). Other research, such as Walker and Main's (1973) study of 
federal judges, discovered that judges made more 'libertarian' judgments in groups of three 
than they did alone. Additionally, students who were asked to decide on the criterion 
method on which they were to be evaluated in a psychology course initially chose a 
conservative method and became more so after group discussion (Clement & Sullivan, 
1970). Some have argued this discrepancy is due to the permanency of the group; groups 
that have a past and perceived future may in fact develop a normative structure that 
attenuates the natural polarization effect (Semin & Glendon, 1973). Findings indicate that 
group polarization seems to be stronger in situations where the group or the situation are 
novel. 
Group polarization has been explained in three main ways. The first, based on 
Festinger's ( 1953) social comparison theory, argues that there is a natural set of values 
related to the group decision. An individual in the group begins with the belief that he is 
more extreme with regard to his value-based preference than the other group members. 
During group discussion he often discovers others' value-based preferences are more 
extreme than his own. Group members then shift their preferences in the direction of the 
more extreme group members (Sanders & Baron, 1977; Codol, 1975). The crucial factor of 
this perspective is that the group members possess knowledge of the other group member's 
views. Evidence supporting this theory has been found in a number of experiments that 
tested a 'mere knowledge' effect, wherein groups were not allowed to engage in group 
discussion but received information about other's preferences (Teger &Pruitt, 1967; 
Blascovich, Veach & Ginsburg, 1973; Blascovich, Ginsburg & Howe, 1975; 1976). Further 
evidence was found for social comparison in an experiment that made the group value more 
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salient by telling subjects that greater intelligence is related to greater estimates of 
movement in an autokinetic effect task (Baron & Roper, 1976). 
Another explanation for group polarization theory is that group members initially have 
opinions based on the small number of persuasive arguments they are able to generate 
regarding the decision. Group discussion allows for people to share arguments, allowing 
many to gain access to information they did not think of on their own. These discussions 
then result in the polarization of opinions based upon the discussion content members 
provide. Support for this explanation was found suggesting the proportion of risky to 
cautious arguments polarized attitudes (Vinokur & Burnstein, 197 4; Ebbesen & Bowers, 
1974). Other research that controlled for social comparison also supported the persuasive 
arguments explanation (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973). 
Not all research, however, supports the persuasive arguments rationale. Zuber, Crott & 
Werner (1992) found that persuasive arguments would predict the shift as occurring prior to 
the group discussion for those who received the information, while social comparison would 
predict group discussion to cause the shift. It was discovered that the shift occurred not 
between the initial baseline measure and after the information treatment, but rather, it 
occurred after the group discussion. This cast doubt on the persuasive arguments 
approach. Stasser & Titus (1985) found that during group discussion, people tend to focus 
on redundant information, often not sharing novel arguments. If people withhold information 
in group discussion, then persuasive arguments may not be as influential to polarization as 
some have posited. 
The third rationale for the group polarization phenomenon is based on Turner's (1987) 
self-categorization theory. This perspective argues polarization occurs as members are 
attempting to identify more closely with the normative position associated with the perceived 
ingroup-prototypical member. Within-group polarization should occur when a salient 
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outgroup is provided as comparison as an effort to differentiate the ingroup from the 
outgroup. Evidence has been found suggesting that polarization is more profound when 
the outgroup opinion is made salient to ingroup members (Mackie & Cooper, 1984; Mackie, 
1986; Abrams et al., 1990; Turner et al., 1989). 
The research evidence on the three explanations of group polarization suggest both the 
social comparison and persuasive arguments approaches are good explanations for 
situations where the groups or the information are novel, which could explain why many 
found little evidence in field experiments where the groups were well established and the 
information well known to the members. The self-categorization approach provides an 
explanation for situations where members have knowledge about the normative beliefs and 
attitudes of their group regarding the subject and group membership is salient by 
comparison to knowledge of outgroup positions. 
Diffusion of Innovations Theory 
Diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers, 1995) describes the process of how an 
innovation is communicated to a population over time. Rogers distinguishes spontaneous 
diffusion, which entails the unplanned spread of information, from directed or managed 
diffusion, which describes deliberate attempts to disseminate information about an 
innovation. The four main elements of the theory include the innovation, communication 
channels, time, and the social system. 
An innovation is "an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or 
other unit of adoption (Rogers, 1995: 11 ). Thus, it does not matter if the innovation is 
actually new or has been around for years, only that the idea is perceived to be new. An 
innovation is technological in nature, having a hardware component, the material or physical 
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object relating to the technology, and a software component, or the informational basis for 
the technology. Because an innovative technology's benefits often are not clear to potential 
adopters, they often have uncertainty regarding the possible consequences of adoption. 
Rogers (1995) identifies five characteristics of innovations that influence their rates of 
adoption. Relative advantage is the perception that the innovation is better than preceding 
ideas. Compatibility refers to how consistent the innovation is with established values and 
practices. Complexity describes how difficult the innovation is to use and understand. 
Trialability describes how available the innovation is to be used on a trial basis without a 
complete commitment. Observability, refers to how visible the results of the innovation are 
to others. 
The second element of the diffusion of innovation, communication channels, describes 
the manner in which the innovation is diffused. Communication channels can be separated 
into mass media channels, such as television, radio, and newspapers, and interpersonal 
channels, which are face-to-face exchanges between individuals. Mass media channels are 
crucial to the diffusion of initial information relating to an innovation, while interpersonal 
channels are often the key to the adoption of an innovation because "most people depend 
mainly upon a subjective evaluation of an innovation that is conveyed to them from other 
individuals like themselves who have previously adopted the innovation" (ibid.:12). 
Time, the third element of the diffusion of innovation theory, is an important element 
because it is so often overlooked in the social science literature, owing primarily to the 
difficulty in measurement and the increased cost of longitudinal data measurement. There 
is little question, however, that time is a vital component in any type of communication 
process, and the idea of diffusion itself, which implies travel, necessarily entails time as well. 
Within this element is the innovation-decision process, wherein a decision-making unit 
(sometimes an individual) moves through five steps: knowledge, or first discovering and 
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gaining information about an innovation, persuasion, which involves forming an attitude 
about the innovation; decision, the symbolic adoption, either passively or actively, of the 
innovation; implementation, a trial period or behavioral adoption of an innovation; and 
confirmation, which involves the seeking of reinforcement of an innovation decision that the 
unit has already made, or reversing the decision based on conflicting information. 
Social system, refers to the social context in which the innovation is being diffused. The 
social system can consist of units from different levels of abstraction, such as organizations, 
groups, or individuals. Understanding the nature of the social system is fundamental to 
understanding diffusion, because diffusion occurs within normative expectations, power 
relationships, and social acceptability. 
Within the social system, opinion leaders, individuals whose opinions about innovations 
strongly influence the opinions of others, often influence not only the rate of adoption, but 
often whether the adoption will occur at all. Opinion leaders typically have high exposure to 
mass communication, are more cosmopolite than followers, have high contact with change 
agents, tend to be higher in socio-economic status, tend to be more innovative, and are 
well-respected within the social system. Opinion leaders tend to be more innovative when 
the group norm favors change, and while they tend to conform to group norms, are also 
often capable of influencing the change of group norms. Roger's diffusion of innovations 
theory has provided numerous contributions to social science. These contributions include, 
but are not limited to the clear and straight-forward manner in which research methods can 
be implemented, the diverse relevance of the model with regard to disciplines, and the focus 
of the theory on application. 
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Summary 
In chapter two, this thesis will examine and critique two approaches to risk as 
explanatory factors predicting acceptance of biotechnology utilizing a national mailed 
questionnaire. Chapter three will analyze consumer opinions of food irradiation, within the 
context of two theories examined above (polarization [choice shift] and innovation-diffusion 
theory), and measured with a time-series design. 
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Chapter 2: A Comparison of Two Approaches to 
Understanding Consumer Opinions of Biotechnology 
Gerald D. Titchener and Stephen G. Sapp 
Abstract 
Two approaches to risk communication about complex and controversial technology are 
compared through analysis of responses to a nationwide survey of 2,070 consumers 
conducted in the United States. Results indicate that key components of the cognitive 
science approach, which emphasizes the importance of information exchange, and the 
sociocultural approach, which emphasizes the importance of trust and perceived ethical 
legitimacy, complement one another as determinants of consumer opinion formation 
regarding complex and controversial technology. Implications for risk communication 
approaches regarding biotechnology are described. 
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Introduction 
A major issue challenging the biotechnology industry as well as the general public is the 
controversial nature of biotechnology among consumers. Negative reactions to 
biotechnology have ranged from suspicion of genetically engineered products in the United 
States to the threatening of the structure of the European Union over the introduction of 
recombinant soybeans and corn (Nestle, 1998). Consumer skepticism in the U.S. might be 
short-lived as bioengineered foods become more common on grocery shelves. On the other 
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hand, the potential negative consequences of not addressing consumer concerns might 
significantly affect the rate of adoption of biotechnology products (Kling, 1997; Dwyer, 2000; 
Dutton, 1999; PRNewswire, 2000). Consumer concerns about the safety of bioengineered 
foods, for example, influenced Gerber's (the maker of baby foods) decision to stop using 
ingredients from genetically engineered crops (Bailey, 2001; CBS News, 2000; Milo Ohr, 
2000). 
What are the key determinants of consumer opinions of biotechnology? The cognitive 
science approach emphasizes that knowledge itself, once transmitted, will lead to the 
acceptance of a technology (Bradbury, 1989; Lupton, 1999). Research using the cognitive 
science approach examines the ways in which people respond to objectively defined risk 
(Slavic, 1987; Sandman, 1987) and explores communication strategies to reduce 
unwarranted public outrage regarding presumed beneficial technologies. 
This view has not gone unchallenged. The sociocultural approach considers risk a 
social process rather than as an independent entity that exists apart from the individuals, 
groups, and institutions that perceive it (Bradbury, 1989). This approach argues that, 
although an understanding of scientific facts is an essential element of public opinion, public 
opinion is influenced strongly as well by trust in institutions, perceptions of value-
orientations, and perceived social acceptability. Freudenburg & Rursch (1994), for example, 
note that "there is a growing body of evidence that levels of information simply are not the 
significant factors in explaining citizen opposition to controversial technologies" (p. 953). 
Issues of trust and value-orientation become important in public assessments of technology. 
Thus, communication strategies that incorporate exercises in trust-building and well-
reasoned public discourse are equally essential to public adoption of complex and 
controversial technology as are attempts at public education about scientific findings. 
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The sociocultural perspective has been used to address the ways in which consumer 
risk assessments reflect public discourse on technology adoption. Beck (1999), for 
example, argues that neither objective hazards nor cultural, political or normative influences 
can be ignored. Beck claims that once potential risks become salient in the public forum, 
the public is left with the responsibility to decide if the risk is worth the potential hazards. 
Thus, ultimately, the people will decide if they wish to eat genetically modified organisms 
(i.e., GMO's). While this decision is somewhat complicated by the lack of disclosure in 
labeling by the biotech industry as well as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's decision 
to require labeling only in foods whose nutritional value has been altered, the lessons 
learned in Europe's rejection of GMO's speaks loudly as to where the final decision of 
adoption or rejection lie. 
This study examined the relative efficacy of the cognitive science and sociocultural 
approaches to understanding public opinions of biotechnology. It compared the explanatory 
power of measures of knowledge and sense of control-indicators of the cognitive science 
approach-with that of measures of trust and perceived social acceptability-indicators of the 
sociocultural approach. The importance of finding support for either of these approaches 
lies in possible implications for communication strategies. If the cognitive science 
perspective more clearly explains the nature of the development of consumer opinion of 
complex and controversial technologies, then an emphasis needs to involve media-based 
presentations of scientific facts, public relation statements, and policy positions intended to 
reduce consumer outrage. If the social constructionist view adds significantly to the 
understanding of consumer opinions, then an emphasis on risk as a socially developed and 
maintained entity is vital. 
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Method 
Sample and Survey Procedures 
The sample was 10,000 households selected at random from a nationwide listing of 
residential dwellings in the 48 contiguous states of the United States. One adult in each 
household was asked to complete and return a mailed instrument containing questions on 
food-buying habits, opinions of food safety issues, opinions of biotechnology, food selection 
when shopping for food, and household characteristics. The mailing procedure consisted of 
just two contacts--an initial mailing with cover letter and questionnaire and a follow-up 
postcard mailed one week later. The response rate for this procedure, accounting for an 
estimated undeliverable rate of 15 percent, was 30 percent (2,510 completed instruments). 
This response rate falls below what would be preferred for a survey sample. Nevertheless, 
the resulting sample characteristics closely match the social-demographic characteristics of 
the U.S. population. 
We wanted respondents who were not yet aware of biotechnology to know some basic 
information about it from the viewpoints of its proponents and opponents. Thus, 
respondents were supplied with this explanation of biotechnology: 
Biotechnology (also called genetic engineering) involves changing the genetic molecular 
structure of plants and animals to produce different varieties or species. Supporters of 
applying biotechnology methods in food production think that doing this will make it 
possible to increase the rate of food production, make the food supply more resistant to 
diseases, and create new foods for consumption. Others, however, think that 
biotechnology has the potential to create serious ethical and food safety issues, may 
contribute additional environmental problems, and may result in narrowing of the gene 
pool and risks to the natural environment. 
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Measurement 
The procedure was to regress indicators of public acceptance of biotechnology on 
variables reflecting the essential elements of the cognitive science and sociocultural 
approaches (Table 1). Opinions of biotechnology were measured using two related 
variables: intent to eat genetically engineered foods and willingness to eat meat produced 
by genetic engineering. Variables used to represent the main elements of the cognitive 
science approach were perceptions of safety, nutritiousness, environmental protection, food 
productivity, sense of control over the technology, and opinions of scientific experts. 
Elements of the sociocultural approach were represented by measures of trust, perceived 
ethical legitimacy of biotechnology, perceived social acceptability of the technology, and 
perceived opinions of biotechnology opponents. 
A latent variable measuring concern about food safety was used to place the 
respondent's opinions of biotechnology within the content of their overall assessment of food 
safety. Food safety concern (alpha reliability= .94) was measured as the averaged 
expression of concern about: antibiotic residues in meat and poultry, aerial spraying of 
pesticides, use of chemical fertilizers, use of insecticides, groundwater contamination from 
livestock manure, pesticide residues in fresh fruit and vegetables, food additives such as 
dyes or preservatives, and hormone residues in foods. Similarly, we measured concern 
about foodborne illness to assess the respondent's wariness about food safety. We asked 
respondents to tell us how concerned they were about E.coli contamination, salmonella in 
the food chain, and hepatitis. The summated latent variable had an alpha reliability of .91. 
We measured opinions of genetically modified foods using five related variables: safety, 
ethics, nutritional value, environmental effects, and effects on food production. The safety of 
genetically modified (biotech) food was measured as the response to the statement, "Eating 
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genetically modified food is a safe thing to do." Ethical legitimacy was measured by 
response to the statement, "Biotechnology poses no significant ethical issues." The 
perceived nutritiousness of genetically modified food was assessed based upon the (reverse 
coded) response to the statement, "Eating genetically modified food will decrease the 
nutritional value of my diet." The perceived environmental safety of genetic engineering was 
measured from response to the statement, "Genetically modified foods are safe for the 
environment." Perceived production benefits was measured using the response to the 
statement, "Biotechnology will help increase food production." 
Sense of control over eating foods produced using genetic modification was measured 
as a latent variable (alpha reliability= .82) based upon the averaged responses to the 
statements, "I will have the final say-so over whether I eat genetically modified food," and 
"The final decision about whether to eat genetically modified food will be up to me." Trust in 
persons/agencies responsible for developing/monitoring genetically modified food was 
measured with two statements, "I trust the food scientists who say that genetically modified 
food is a good idea," and "I trust public health officials who support biotechnology." 
Perceived social acceptability of eating genetically modified foods was the averaged 
responses (alpha reliability = .64) to the statements, "Most people will be in favor of eating 
genetically modified food," and "Eating genetically modified food likely will be accepted by 
the American public." Inputs from "experts" was measured as responses to two statements, 
"Food scientists think I should eat genetically modified food," and "Consumer advocacy 
groups think I should eat genetically modified food." Each of these statements was 
weighted by responses to statements about compliance with expert opinion (i.e., "I do what 
food scientists think I should do," and "I do what consumer advocacy groups think I should 
do"). Social demographic control variables included age (measured in years), education 
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(measured in years}, and total household income before taxes in the year preceding the 
survey (1999) recorded in seven ordinal categories. 
Results 
Listwise deletion of missing cases yielded a final sample of 2,070 persons. The sample 
consisted of older, well-educated persons of moderate income (Table 1). The average 
scores on food safety concern (3.77) and concerns about foodborne illness (4.31) indicated 
wariness about food safety. The averaged scores for perceived safety (3.06), intent to eat 
(2.99), and willingness to eat (3.07) bioengineered foods showed neither strong acceptance 
nor strong rejection of biotechnology. We included in the description of biotechnology to 
respondents viewpoints of both proponents and opponents. Previous studies (e.g., Sapp & 
Harrod, 1990) indicate that any "negative" information has a strong influence on initial 
opinions of complex and controversial technology, and that type of influence might have 
affected initial reactions to biotechnology among the respondents. The respondents did not 
express strong trust in scientists and public health officials who endorse biotechnology. 
They were concerned about food safety and the potential for experiencing foodborne illness. 
And respondents were somewhat concerned about the ethical legitimacy of biotechnology. 
The results of ordinary least squares regression analysis was used to determine the 
relative effects of indicators of cognitive and social influences on opinions of biotechnology. 
The results (Table 2) show that perceived safety of biotechnology is the most important 
indicator of intent and willingness to eat. Likewise, other indicators of cognitive influences 
on acceptance, such as perceived nutritiousness, environmental safety, and production 
benefits significantly affect intent and willingness to eat. But sociocultural factors seem to 
be very important indicators of acceptance as well. Trust in scientists and public health 
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officials, for example, were important indicators of acceptance, as were perceived social 
acceptability and perceived ethical legitimacy of genetically engineered foods. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
The study examined the relative effects of variables reflecting the cognitive science and 
sociocultural approaches to understanding consumer responses to complex and 
controversial new technologies. The results support Beck's eclectic approach to 
understanding consumer risk assessments, wherein consumer risk assessments cannot be 
understood solely in terms of individualist interpretations of technical information, but must 
also be understood to reflect perceived social acceptability and trust in experts. 
The development of social acceptability and trust in experts and the formation of 
attitudes, beliefs, norms, and values occur through social interaction with others within a 
context of normative expectations. If attitudes and beliefs are not well established, as is 
often the case with new and controversial technology, it logically follows that normative 
influences may carry more weight in the development of those beliefs and attitudes. 
Furthermore, if the norms that help guide decisions to adopt or reject the new technology 
are not yet formed, new group norms must be developed. In novel situations especially, 
group norms function to provide context and guide behavior (e.g., Sherif, 1936). Thus, 
newly established group norms motivate individual compliance to group pressures and 
provide context for individual perception of the situation. In novel or ambiguous social 
situations, group norms serve not only as guideposts for behavior, but also provide social 
context that is matched against individual perceptions in the development of attitudes and 
beliefs. 
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Several well-established and empirically supported theoretical approaches have been 
developed to help social scientists understand social interaction processes involved in 
consumer opinion formation regarding complex and controversial new technologies. The 
innovation-decision process (Rogers, 1995), the theory of rational expectations (Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975), and the health-belief model (Rosenstock, 1974) are examples of 
conceptual approaches to understanding how initially ill-formed opinions become more 
crystallized over time through consideration of persuasive arguments, inputs from social 
comparison with others, and formation of new normative expectations. The results of the 
current study indicate that such approaches might prove useful in understanding consumer 
opinion formation regarding genetically engineered foods. 
Individuals, rather than experts, ultimately will decide whether to adopt or reject new 
technology. Additionally, a large proportion of the individual's decision is influenced by 
norms, attitudes, beliefs and values. Social influences must then be incorporated within 
theoretical approaches to best understand the potential adoption or rejection of complex and 
controversial new technologies. It follows that biotech corporations, whose current policies 
regarding consumer skepticism and outrage seem to involve only direct and peripheral route 
persuasive techniques, could benefit from examining the issue from the vantage of 
sociocultural risk theory. Strategies might involve building trust by working with opinion 
leaders and recognizing the influence of socially constructed ethical positions, perceived 
social acceptability, and social networking on consumer opinion formation. Similarly, 
organizations that challenge the efficacy and/or ethics of genetically engineered foods will 
need to address both the cognitive and social constructionist elements of consumer opinion 
formation. 
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Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics for variables used in the models (n=2.070). 
Variable Frequency Percent 
Income Categories: 
Less than $10,000 
$10,000 to $19,999 
$20,000 to $34,999 
$35,000 to $49,999 
$50,000 to $74,999 
$75,000 to $100,000 
More than $100,000 
63 
172 
412 
440 
523 
255 
205 
Intent to eat genetically modified food 
Willingness to eat genetically modified meat 
Perceived safety of biotech foods 
Perceived nutritiousness of biotech foods 
3.0 
8.3 
19.9 
21.3 
25.3 
12.3 
9.9 
Perceived environmental safety of biotechnology 
Perceived production benefits of biotechnology 
Sense of control over biotechnology 
Perceived opinions of food scientists 
Perceived opinions of consumer advocates 
Trust in scientists who endorse biotech 
Trust in public health officials who endorse biotech 
Perceived ethical legitimacy of biotechnology 
Perceived social acceptability of biotechnology 
Concerns about food safety 
Concerns about foodborne illness 
Age of the respondent 
Education of the respondent 
Description 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 25 
range: 1 - 25 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 5 
range: 1 - 93 
range: 1 - 30 
Mean Std. Dev. 
2.99 0.90 
3.07 1.14 
3.06 0.80 
3.28 0.74 
3.12 0.70 
3.50 0.73 
4.00 0.92 
6.78 3.55 
5.79 3.04 
2.96 0.92 
3.01 0.89 
2.69 0.88 
2.99 0.65 
3.77 1.02 
4.31 0.94 
53.21 15.14 
14.19 3.13 
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Table 2. 
Standardized parameter estimates for the independent variables on intent to and 
willingness to eat genetically modified foods (n = 2.070). 
Intent Willingness 
Variables to Eat 
Perceived safety of biotech foods .254** 
Perceived nutritiousness of biotech foods .114** 
Perceived environmental safety of biotechnology .132** 
Perceived production benefits of biotechnology .150** 
Sense of control over biotechnology -.009 
Perceived opinions of food scientists .033* 
Perceived opinions of consumer advocates -.001 
Trust in scientists who endorse biotechnology .120** 
Trust in public health officials endorsing biotechnology .124** 
Perceived ethical compatibility of biotechnology .093** 
Perceived social acceptability of biotechnology .088** 
Concerns about food safety -.014 
Concerns about foodborne illness .013 
Age of the respondent .032* 
Education of the respondent -.008 
Household income .003 
R-Square .60 
F ratio 194.008** 
* 
** 
Parameter estimate or F ratio is statistically significant at prob. < .05. 
Parameter estimate or F ratio is statistically significant at prob. < .01. 
to Eat 
.240** 
.129** 
.033 
.047* 
-.045** 
-.012 
-.001 
.128** 
.073** 
.055** 
.073** 
-.216** 
.075** 
-.023 
.036 
.028 
.43 
97.962** 
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Chapter 3: A Longitudinal Examination of Factors 
Affecting Consumer Opinions of Food Irradiation 
A manuscript to be submitted to The Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 
Gerald D. Titchener and Stephen G. Sapp 
Introduction 
The extreme complexity and rapid growth of scientific knowledge has resulted in the 
need for more specialized experts who oversee the creation of technology. This more 
specialized division of labor between technological experts and the public requires that 
consumers rely upon the assurances of those same experts to report that a given 
technological advance has been thoroughly tested and safe (Freudenburg & Pastor, 1992; 
Freudenburg & Rursch, 1994; Freudenburg, 1996). As technological developments in food 
production and processing become a larger part of our lives, the need for a more complete 
understanding of how these new complex and controversial technologies (CCT's) affect and 
are affected by individual opinions becomes vital to social science efforts to effectively 
facilitate public decision-making about them. 
Risk as a social issue has spawned much research into the nature of risk perceptions. 
This literature is organized primarily into two major areas: the cognitive-science or technical 
approach (Lupton, 1999; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1979; Fife-Schaw & 
Rowe, 1996; Marris, et al, 1997; Douglas, 1985; 1992, Bradbury, 1989), which focuses on 
objective hazards and views risk as probabilistic, rational and calculable, and the 
sociocultural approach, which argues that risk is socially constructed and maintained, and 
can never be a completely value-free process (Lupton, 1999; Douglas, 1985; 1992; 
Bradbury, 1989; Ewald, 1991; Fox, 1999; Freudenburg & Pastor, 1992; Freudenburg & 
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Rursch, 1994; Freudenburg; 1996; Hilgartner, 1992; Wynne, 1996). In attempts to 
understand risk perceptions, the cognitive-science (technical) approach focuses mainly on 
psychometric studies that emphasize the importance of perceived safety (Trumbo, 1996; 
Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1978; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1979; Fife-Schaw & 
Rowe, 1996; Slovic, 1986; Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2001 ). The sociocultural perspective, by 
comparison, posits that perceived safety will strongly influence risk perceptions, but asserts 
that social, cultural and demographic factors also will significantly influence adoption 
decisions (Kone & Mullet, 1994; Sapp, Harrod & Zhao, 1995; Sapp & Harrod, 1990; Eyles, 
Taylor, Baxter, Sider & Willms, 1993; Bord & O'Conner, 1990; Flynn, Burns, Mertz & Slovic, 
1992). Some recent evidence has suggested both cognitive/technical and sociocultural 
factors are important to the intention to eat genetically modified food (Titchener & Sapp, in 
press). As it is ultimately the consumer who decides whether to adopt a complex and 
controversial technology, it is important to understand not only the contributing factors 
associated with acceptance of a CCT, but also to understand how risk perceptions might 
change over time, how factors that influence perceptions might change over time, and how 
the influence of key factors might change in their relative effect on perceptions over time. In 
an effort to examine the relative effects of key factors leading to attitude change and 
acceptance of CCT's, therefore, it may be helpful to consider which variables are important 
over time as well as their relative strength over time. 
The literature on attitude change suggests how time might affect people's perceptions of 
CCT's. One theory dealing with attitude change over time is group polarization theory 
(Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Lamm, 1976). In the early 1960's, James Stoner 
(1961) discovered that group decisions about hypothetical situations were observed to be 
riskier than the decisions made by individuals previously. Originally dubbed "risky shift" 
(later more accurately termed 'choice shift'), this phenomenon was found to occur when 
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groups discuss attitudes held by its members; the attitudes agreed upon by consensus were 
more extreme than the mean of the individual attitudes (Myers, 1975). It was later 
discovered that this shift to risk was in fact a shift to extreme when experiments found 
groups sometimes made more cautious choices than did the individuals previously (Stoner, 
1968; Fraser, Gouge & Billig, 1971) and its name was changed to group-induced attitude 
polarization (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Lamm, 1976), or more commonly known 
as group polarization or choice shift. 
Three major explanations for the group polarization phenomenon have emerged in the 
literature; the social comparison explanation (Sanders & Baron, 1977), the persuasive 
arguments explanation (Isenberg, 1986), and self-categorization explanation (Turner, 1987). 
The social comparison perspective argues that an individual will presume their opinion is 
more extreme than others in the group (Codol, 1975), but during interaction with others will 
become aware of other, more extreme, opinions, and adjust their opinions accordingly. 
Driven by a motivation to present themselves in the best possible manner guides people 
then to find the average tendency of the group and present their viewpoints as slightly more 
desirable than, as well as distinctive from, the average (Brown, 1974; Myers, 1978). This 
interactive process creates inertia toward polarization of group opinion to more extreme 
viewpoints than those expressed prior to interactions with others. 
The persuasive arguments perspective (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973, 1977; Madsen, 
1978; Burnstein, Vinokur & Trope, 1973; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974, 1978a) asserts that the 
position held by an individual regarding an issue is influenced by the argument's 
persuasiveness and the number of pro and con arguments presented. This emphasis on 
the message rather than the normative structure makes this perspective appealing, and a 
fair amount of support has been generated for it. But not everyone has found this 
perspective compelling. Some (Zuber et al., 1992) have found no support for persuasive 
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arguments and evidence for social comparison and others (Stasser & Titus, 1985) have 
found that, while persuasive arguments assumes people share new information with the 
group (which in turn leads to polarization), groups members tend to focus more on 
redundant information, horde information, and therefore influence and are influenced 
themselves more by opinion sharing. 
The third explanation for group polarization emerges from self-categorization theory 
(Turner, 1987), which argues that social identity is the key factor to polarization (Wetherell, 
1987). According to this theory, a group has a perceived prototypically normative position to 
which the members adhere. In situations where intergroup relationships are made more 
salient, self-categorization theory argues attitudes polarize to help differentiate ingroup from 
outgroup identity (Mackie & Cooper, 1984). 
Which perspective, then, has more influence on the group polarization phenomenon, 
social comparison, persuasive arguments or self-categorization? Isenberg (1986) found, in 
an analysis of effect size for a number of group polarization studies, a respectable effect 
size for mere-exposure studies (social comparison [mean r=.436]), but found a significantly 
larger effect size for the persuasive arguments studies (mean r=. 7 46) (p. 1149). In other 
studies, some robust evidence has been found for self-categorization theory's effects on 
group polarization (Mackie, 1986; Abrams et al., 1990; Turner et al., 1989). So, while 
persuasive arguments theory explains a great deal of the polarization phenomenon, the 
normative nature of the social interaction cannot be ruled out as a co-contributor, nor can 
social identity in situations where group identity is salient. One could expect, then, if 
individuals were presented with two equal sides of an argument relating to a technology that 
is relatively novel in nature, that as they interacted with significant others, they would (1) 
compare their newly developed beliefs and attitudes, (2) attempt to establish, over time, a 
view slightly more polarized than the normative mean of the group, (3) polarize over time 
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from engaging in an active dialogue and presenting arguments relating to the issue, and (4) 
polarize over time if accepting the technology as a normative factor in the individual's group 
identity. But in situations where equal amounts of equal quality information is provided to 
individuals regarding a novel CCT, which direction will the polarization move, in favor of the 
new technology or against its adoption? None of the potential explanations of polarization 
predicts direction of change. 
Diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers, 1995) provides a rationale for predicting 
direction of change. This theory describes the process by which an innovation is diffused 
within a social system over time. The four main components of the theory are: the 
innovation, the communication, their corresponding channels, and time (Rogers, 1995). The 
term innovation suggests a specific type of material or nonmaterial technology that is 
perceived as new by potential end user. Rogers identifies three types of information related 
to innovations: hardware (information about the innovation itself), software (information 
about how the innovation works), and innovation-evaluation (information about how well the 
innovation works). Communication channels can take the form of mass media, which are 
important to diffuse initial information regarding the innovation, and interpersonal channels, 
which are crucial for the adoption of the innovation. 
The diffusion process is posited to occur in five stages (Rogers, 1995). The first stage, 
knowledge, denotes an awareness of the innovation, wherein the information types 
(hardware, software and innovation-evaluation) play key roles. The second stage, 
persuasion, is where attitude formation of the potential adopter occurs. The third stage, 
decision, describes the time when the innovation is symbolically adopted or 
actively/passively rejected. The forth stage, implementation, refers to the period of time 
where actual behavioral adoption (trail period) of the innovation takes place. The fifth and 
final stage, confirmation, involves seeking of reinforcement, wherein the adopter may either 
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continue to use the innovation or discontinue its use due to conflicting messages about the 
innovation, replacement of the innovation by a better one, changes in the scientific evidence 
supporting the innovation, or changes in social conditions that support the need for the 
innovation. During the innovation-decision process, specifically in the persuasion stage, the 
influence of opinion leaders, individuals who have the ability to influence other's opinions 
regarding innovations and who have the influence to change norms, becomes a key to the 
process of adoption of the innovation. Trust in opinion leaders is a key factor to the 
acceptance of a new CCT. Additionally, diffusion of innovation theory suggests other key 
factors to the adoption of an innovation. Characteristics of the innovation, such as its 
relative advantage over previous practices, compatibility with existing values and practices, 
complexity, trialability, and observability affect adoption decisions. In situations where there 
is approximately equal quality and quantity of persuasive arguments for and against an 
innovation, the diffusion of innovations model predicts that change, over time, will occur in 
the direction of the trusted opinion leader's beliefs and attitudes because these 
persons/organizations have the most influence during the social comparison process. 
This article investigates the technological innovation food irradiation. Irradiation is used 
to reduce the spoilage of food and to kill food-borne bacteria that can cause disease (Olsen, 
1998; Greenberg, 1996; CDC, 1999). While it has its roots in research reaching back to the 
1950's, it was not until December, 1997 that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approved its use for irradiating red meats (Olsen, 1998). Currently, irradiation has been 
approved by the FDA for wheat, flour, potatoes, spices, tea, fruits and vegetables, pork, 
chicken, turkey, beef, lamb, and other fresh and frozen red meats (Iowa State Food Safety 
Project, 2001 ). 
While food irradiation is deemed to be safe by the FDA and (most of the) scientific 
community, it is not without controversy. Those who argue that the irradiation of food is 
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more hazardous than is generally thought tend to focus their concerns around several 
areas: the process of food irradiation, which is claimed to be not well regulated (Louria, 
1987), chemical changes in the irradiated food that are alleged to occur and may be 
associated with higher levels of polyploid cells (cells with abnormalities) and free-radical 
molecules and atoms (that have unpaired electrons, are unstable, and are associated with 
the destruction of living tissue) (Srikantia, 1987; Louria, 1987), and questions surrounding 
the possible loss of nutritional value associated with irradiation (Louria, 1987; Srikantia, 
1987). When considering the seriousness of these potential hazards, combined with the 
determination of the consumer advocate groups who are against the adoption of food 
irradiation, the public has expressed some reluctance to adopt, although the market tests 
that provided the context for data collection in this study have demonstrated consumer 
willingness to purchase irradiated food. 
Group polarization theory suggests that polarization is more likely to occur when people 
are confronted with relatively novel or unusual situations and interact with other members of 
a group to bring about attitudes more extreme than the average of individual attitudes prior 
to interaction. The innovation-decision process argues that the group's positively valued 
norm is greatly influenced by the group's opinion leaders. Given a complex and 
controversial technology, it would be expected that acceptance of it would, over time, be 
affected by the polarizing influences of the norms established by the group as influenced by 
trusted opinion leaders. 
The current study did not focus directly on the interactions involved in the group 
polarization process. Instead, we collected longitudinal panel data over a three month 
period during market testing of irradiated beef patties, and based upon principles of 
polarization theory and diffusion of innovations theory, we hypothesize that over time, 
attitudes will polarize in the direction of trusted opinion leaders who will strongly influence 
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individual opinions. In accordance with the social constructivist perspective, we hypothesize 
also that attitudes and changes in attitudes will be significantly affected by perceived social 
acceptability and sense of identity with food irradiation. 
Method 
The Sample 
The data come from a longitudinal, panel study of one adult each in 223 households 
located in the Minneapolis, Minnesota metropolitan area. During the spring and summer of 
2000, Huisken's Meats, Inc. conducted the first large-scale, commercially-funded market test 
of irradiated food (i.e., beef patties) in supermarkets located throughout Minneapolis. Data 
collection was initiated at the beginning of this market test. Potential respondents were 
selected at random from all households with telephones located within the Minneapolis 
interstate highway loop (1494, 1694). The initial telephone contact asked for either a male or 
female adult based upon a random selection procedure. This person was asked if they 
were interested in participating in a study of food safety (i.e., food irradiation was not 
mentioned at this time). If the person agreed to participate, they were sent Questionnaire 1 
(Q1) and an incentive fee of $15.00 to participate further. Q1 asked questions to obtain 
social demographic information, information about media exposure, and opinions about 
general food safety issues. Respondents were encouraged to return a completed 
questionnaire as an indication they were interested in continuing with a longitudinal study. 
Of the 459 persons who said they wanted to participate in the study, 281 (61 %) completed 
the first questionnaire and were sent Questionnaire 2 (Q2), at which time they were 
informed that the remainder of the study would focus on food irradiation. 
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For half the households (assigned at random), Q2 was accompanied by an information 
packet. This packet contained two 15-minute videotapes. The first videotape, which was 
prepared by the Iowa State University Extension Service (ISU), presented food irradiation in 
a favorable manner and included endorsements of the technology from the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) and representatives of other public health agencies. The second 
videotape was reproduced with permission from an Enviro Close-Up television program that 
featured an interview with Mr. Michael Colby, the Executive Director of Food & Water, Inc., 
the leading advocacy organization opposed to food irradiation. The information packet also 
contained written materials produced at ISU, which presented food irradiation in a favorable 
manner, and Food & Water's Activist's Primer, which presented opposition arguments to 
food irradiation and informed persons about how to stop it from being adopted. 
The videotapes and written materials delivered to subjects assigned to C2 were 
selected, as much as possible, to present a balanced perspective on opposing viewpoints of 
food irradiation. It was recognized, however, that subjects might perceive the information 
presented on behalf of proponents and opponents to differ in ease of understanding and 
quality of videotape production. Latent variables (range = 1 - 7) were constructed from 
statements assessing these two characteristics of the information packet materials. Factor 
analysis indicated unidimensional scales, and the reliabilities of the latent variables equaled 
.91 and .87, respectively, for materials presented for proponents and opponents. A weight 
variable was calculated that equaled the percentage of scale difference in these two latent 
variables. The average percentage difference equaled 8% more favorable impression of the 
quality of materials presented on behalf of proponents. The weight variable was used to 
adjust the responses of subjects who received the information packet. 
Persons who did not receive the information packet (Condition 1) were informed that 
others in the sample had received one, but they were being asked to complete Q2 and then 
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learn about the topic on their own. Persons who received the information packet (Condition 
2) were asked to complete Q2 prior to seeking out additional information about food 
irradiation from existing materials or by talking with friends, neighbors, or others. All 
subjects were informed they were not required to purchase or eat irradiated food to be 
eligible to participate in the food irradiation component of the study. Questionnaire 3 (Q3) 
was sent three months after respondents returned Q2. Of the 281 persons who agreed to 
participate, 223 returned a completed third questionnaire, which represented an attrition rate 
of 21 percent. Telephone <;alls and letters were used to reduce the attrition rate as low as 
possible. 
Measurement of Variables 
Questionnaires 2 and 3, which were nearly identical in content, asked respondents for 
their opinions of food irradiation, their perceptions about its safety, and other information as 
described below. Most variables were measured as latent constructs using Likert-type 
questions with seven-point response scales. The statements used as observed indicators, 
the range of the response scales, and the reliability statistics for the latent variables appear 
in Table I. Principal components factor analysis indicated that the factor structure of all 
latent variables was unidimensional at both T1 and T2. 
Acceptance of food irradiation as a good idea (i.e., symbolic adoption) was measured to 
indicate an affective (i.e., attitudinal) evaluation of food irradiation. Perceived safety was 
measured with respect to safety for self and for others. Q2 and Q3 included questions to 
assess both perceived risk and perceived safety; but, to reduce problems with collinearity in 
model estimation, just perceived safety was used in the analysis (unreported analysis using 
perceived risk yielded similar results as those reported). Sjoberg (2001) notes that 
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perceived worry, which connotes an emotional response, compared with perceived risk, 
which calls for more of an intellectual judgment, are distinct concepts with differing effects 
on acceptance. Perceived worry about general issues of food safety was assessed using 
questions from Q 1. Much research notes the effects of mass media presentations on 
perceptions and acceptance of complex technologies. Questions that appeared on Q1 
measured frequency of media exposure (all respondents reported being exposed at least 
once a month to the four media listed on the survey instrument), which were weighted by 
attention to the media when presented with food safety information. The analysis included 
measures of key outrage factors affecting acceptance and perceptions of food technologies. 
Latent constructs measuring perceived control, and sense of identity with eating irradiated 
food had reliability estimates ranging from .71 to .81 for the two time periods. The 
polarization concept and the innovation-decision process imply that social acceptability is 
critical to perceptions and acceptance, especially after persons have had the opportunity to 
interact with others. Social acceptability was measured using two related statements about 
acceptance by the general public. Amount of formal education and household income 
before taxes in 1999 each were measured on ordinal scales with five response categories. 
Central to the argument here is that opinions will change in the direction of those of 
opinion leaders. Typically, family and friends have a strong influence on opinions about 
CCT's. Opinion leaders, however, are defined as persons and/or organizations with 
recognized expertise as well as influence on risky decision-making. Nationwide social 
surveys indicate that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the American Medical 
Association (AMA), and the American Dietetic Association (ADA) are recognized as opinion 
leaders in the area of food safety. Q1 asked respondents how much trust they had in these 
organizations. The means scores (1-7 scale, with 7 indicating strong trust) of 5.08, 5.57, 
and 5.11 for trust in the FDA, AMA, and ADA, respectively, show moderate support for these 
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organizations as opinion leaders. Questions on Q2 and Q3 were used to assess the extent 
to which respondents' opinions were influenced by these organizations. Respondents were 
asked for their agreement with the statements, "If the [U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 
American Medical Association, American Dietetic Association] approves of food irradiation, 
then I can go along with it." Responses to these items were weighted by the respondent's 
trust in the organizations to measure the influence of opinion leadership on acceptance of 
food irradiation. 
Results 
The sex ratio for both conditions was biased towards females, but the extent of bias was 
not significantly different across conditions (Table II). The age, income, and education of 
the respondents did not differ significantly across conditions. (The scores for worry and 
attention to media are listed in Table II as existing at T1, but were measured approximately 
one week prior to T1 based upon responses to Q1 .) Neither food safety worry nor attention 
to media presentations about food safety differed significantly by condition (although 
subjects in C2 expressed worry significantly greater than the scale mid-point). In summary, 
although the sample was biased towards females, subjects across conditions did not differ 
significantly in social demographic conditions, worry about food safety, or attention to media 
presentations about food safety. 
At Time 1, subjects who did not receive the information packet (C1) expressed 
acceptance of food irradiation nearly at the mid-point of the seven-point response scale. 
Also, their average score for perceived safety was not statistically different than the scale 
mid-point. The average scores for both acceptance and perceived safety for persons who 
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did receive the information packet (C2), however, were significantly lower than the scale 
mid-points (Table II). 
The mean scores for the weighted measures of opinion leadership were significantly 
below the scale mid-point for both conditions and at both T1 and T2. Also, persons in C2, 
who received some indication of the viewpoints of opinion leaders in the videotape 
materials, expressed less compliance with the opinions of opinion leaders than did persons 
in C1. 
Although persons in C1 expressed a sense of control over purchasing/eating irradiated 
food significantly higher than the scale mid-point, and persons in C2 expressed control 
significantly lower than the scale mid-point, the difference between these scores at T1 was 
not significant (Table II). Subjects in both conditions expressed little sense of identity with 
food irradiation and perceived social acceptability to be significantly lower than the scale 
mid-point at T1 . And at T1 subjects in C2 expressed significantly lower sense of identity and 
perceived social acceptability than did persons assigned to C1. 
As would be anticipated from studies of polarization and innovation diffusion, opinions 
for subjects in both conditions were significantly different at T2 than at T1 (Table II). 
Average acceptance for subjects in C1 was significantly higher than the scale mid-point at 
T2, but not at T1, and this increased acceptance from T1 to T2 was statistically significant. 
Although the average acceptance for subjects in C2 was significantly lower than the scale 
mid-point at both T1 and T2, it was significantly higher at T2 compared with T1. A similar 
pattern of increased expression of favorability toward food irradiation at T2 was found in 
examining scores for perceived safety. That is, subjects in both conditions expressed a 
greater sense of safety at T2 compared with their expressed perceptions at T1. 
Acceptance and perceived safety still differed significantly across conditions at T2 (Table 
II). Thus, the negative effects of the information packet seemed to continue influencing 
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acceptance and perceived safety three months after their delivery to subjects. But the initial 
effects of the negative information might not continue to have such a strong effect over time. 
On average, acceptance, perceived safety, and perceived social acceptability increased by 
27.0, 26.1, and 22.2 percent, respectively, for persons in C2 from T1 to T2 compared with 
19.9, 15.7, and 19.9 percent, respectively for persons in C1 from T1 to T2. That is, overall 
evaluations and perceived social acceptability increased at a more rapid rate from T1 to T2 
for persons who received the information packet that contained, among other information, 
endorsements from opinion leaders. 
Perceived social acceptability was significantly higher at T2 than at T1 for all subjects 
(Table II). But persons in C2 expressed significantly lower perceived social acceptability at 
T2 than did persons assigned to C1. For all subjects, average scores for perceived control 
were higher at T2 than at T1. This change was statistically significant for subjects assigned 
to C1, but not for those assigned to C2. At T2, persons in C2 had a significantly lower 
sense of control over food irradiation than did persons in C 1. Sense of identity was lower at 
T2 than at T1 for subjects in C1. Although sense of identity did not improve much from T1 
to T2 for persons in C2, this change was statistically significant. 
Acceptance and perceived safety were regressed on variables measuring reported 
compliance with opinion leaders, emotions, and social demographic characteristics to 
determine which factors most influenced these evaluations (Tables Ill and IV). The results 
indicated that, at both T1 and T2, for subjects in both conditions, perceived safety was the 
most important determinant of acceptance, and this variable, in conjunction with other model 
variables, explained much of the variance in acceptance (Table Ill). For persons who 
received the information packet, especially at T2, reported compliance with opinion leaders 
also significantly affected acceptance. Note that the signs of the parameter estimates 
indicated problems with collinearity for the data from subjects in C1 at both T1 and T2. 
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Problems with collinearity were anticipated when estimating the effects of eleven related 
variables on a dependent variable. It was difficult, however, to speculate why collinearity 
was problematic in the data from subjects who did not receive the information packet and 
not so in the data from subjects who did receive the information packet. 
The results presented in Table IV show that, although reported compliance, sense of 
identity, and perceived social acceptability were not highly effective in explaining 
acceptance, they were significant indicators of perceived safety. Outrage factors, perceived 
social acceptability, and age, in addition to the effects of other model variables, were 
sufficient to explain a large amount of variance in perceived safety, especially for subjects in 
C2. 
What variables most influenced changes in acceptance and perceived safety over time? 
Research on the polarization phenomenon and the diffusion of innovations model suggests 
that perceived social acceptability and reported compliance with opinion leaders, 
respectively, would be key determinants of changing acceptance and risk perceptions. To 
test these hypotheses, residualized change scores were computed for acceptance and 
perceived safety by regressing scores on these variables at T2 on their scores at T1 (i.e., a 
lagged dependent variable), the scores of the independent variables at T1 (i.e., controls at 
T1), and the percentage change in independent variables from T1 to T2 (i.e., the cross-
lagged effects of the independent variables). To reduce problems of collinearity, estimated 
models included just those variables that changed over time (i.e., worry, attention to media, 
and social demographic characteristics were omitted). Additional analysis that added these 
variables to the model revealed the same pattern of significant parameter estimates as 
those presented in Table V. 
After controlling for the effects of the lagged dependent variables, changes in 
acceptance from T1 to T2 were found to be significantly affected by changes in perceived 
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safety, but not by changes in reported compliance with the viewpoints of opinion leaders 
(Table V). Changes in perceived safety, after controlling for perceived safety at T1, were 
significantly affected by changes in reported compliance with opinion leaders, and, for 
subjects in C2, also by changes in perceived control, sense of identity, and perceived social 
acceptability. As one would expect, the cross-lagged models explained much of the 
variance in acceptance and perceived safety at T2. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This study investigated determinants of acceptance and perceived safety of food 
irradiation to inform risk communication strategies designed to facilitate well-reasoned public 
discourse about complex food technologies. The study collected information on 
acceptance, perceived safety, and their determinants twice--at the point of introducing the 
topic to subjects (T1) and three months afterwards (T2). Subjects were randomly assigned 
to two conditions--those who received an information packet that contained videotape and 
written materials from proponents and opponents of food irradiation (C2) and those who did 
not receive an information packet (C1). Acceptance--measured as affective evaluation--and 
perceived safety--a latent variable summarizing cognitive beliefs about the safety of food 
irradiation--as well as reported compliance with opinion leaders, and perceived social 
acceptability of food irradiation, increased significantly from T1 to T2 for subjects in both 
conditions. Perceived safety was the most important indicator of acceptance. Reported 
compliance with opinion leaders significantly affected acceptance at T1, but not at T2. 
Reported compliance did, however, significantly affect perceived safety for all subjects at T1 
and for persons in C2 at T2. Perceived social acceptability and sense of identity had 
significant effects on perceived safety for all subjects, at both T1 and T2. 
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Risk communication strategies sometimes overemphasize dissemination of scientific 
facts, thinking that if consumers hear these facts, they will adopt the technology. Such 
strategies typically do not account for the effects that opposition messages will have on 
consumers. Given that negative information carries more weight than does positive 
information, technology opponents typically have the advantage over proponents in swaying 
opinion formation through initial mass media communications. This disproportionate effect 
of negative information occurs in addition to any social amplification of risk that might occur 
due to media effects on opinions (see Kasperson et al.). Thus, the findings supported those 
of previous studies that demonstrate the disproportionate effect of negative information, 
even when statements from proponents included endorsements from the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration and other public health officials. The findings indicated, however, that 
this disproportionate effect of negative information might not be a lasting one. The 
descriptive statistics and the results of the estimation of the cross-lagged model showed 
that, over time, changes in perceived social acceptability, sense of identity, and sense of 
control were important determinants of changes in acceptance and perceived safety. After 
having time to think about the technology and discuss it with friends, family, and others, 
subjects perceived food irradiation to be more socially acceptable and perceived a greater 
sense of control over and identity with it. Consequently, acceptance and perceived safety, 
for persons in both conditions, increased significantly from T1 to T2. 
A critical hypothesis was that acceptance and perceived safety would be significantly 
affected by reported compliance with opinion leaders, especially at T2 after subjects had the 
opportunity to think about the technology and presumably rely upon the viewpoints of 
opinion leaders. This hypothesis was supported for perceived safety, but not for 
acceptance. It might be that the innovation-decision process is more complex than specified 
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in the diffusion of innovations model, or that outrage factors play a larger role in technology 
adoption than posited by diffusion theory. 
The findings have limited generalizability in that the analysis relied upon a convenience 
sample of Midwesterners. Also, to better examine the effects of time on opinion formation, it 
would be preferable to have at least three time periods of data collection. And additional 
measures, perhaps qualitative in nature, of the interactions involved in socially constructed 
risk assessments would enhance the ability to link empirical data with theories of 
polarization and/or the innovation-decision process. Nevertheless, the findings supported 
hypotheses that can be derived from these theories. Acceptance, perceived safety, and the 
determinants of these opinions changed significantly over time and in predictable directions. 
The model was estimated with a subset of outrage factors because of observed 
problems with collinearity, particularly for the data collected from subjects assigned to C1. It 
would have been preferable to include in the estimated model measures of more outrage 
factors. One approach to including more variables in a model and avoiding problems with 
collinearity is to specify in a theoretically meaningful manner causal relationships within a 
structural equation model. Others (Frewer et al., 1998) have suggested that studies of 
consumer risk assessments need to move in this direction. And theoretical frameworks, 
such as the innovation-decision process of the diffusion of innovations model, exist that can 
serve as a starting point for more advanced conceptual development of risk perception 
studies. The findings here seem to indicate that perceived safety (or a related measure of 
cognitive beliefs, such as perceived risk) mediates the effects of opinion leadership, 
perceived social acceptability, sense of control, and sense of identity on acceptance. The 
findings indicate as well that social demographic variables, albeit important elements of 
acceptance and perceived safety/risk, are mediated by perceptions and outrage factors. 
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The findings indicate, as has been found in previous research, that "good ideas do not sell 
themselves" (Rogers, 1995). Awareness of technical information is one key component of 
perceived safety and acceptance, but compliance with opinion leadership, perceived social 
acceptability, and emotion-based factors also play critical roles in consumer technology 
evaluation. 
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Table I. Description of and Cronbach reliability estimates for the dependent and independent 
variables at Time 1 and Time 2. 
Reliability 
Variable DescriQtion Time 1 Time2 
AcceQtance For me, eating irradiated food would be beneficial. .94 .94 
Range: 1 - 7 For me, eating irradiated food would be good. 
For me, eating irradiated food would be wise. 
For me, eating irradiated food would be desirable. 
Perceived safety Eating irradiated food is a safe thing to do. .89 .87 
Range: 1 - 7 Eating irradiated food will be safer than eating 
non-irradiated food. 
Eating irradiated food will be safer for small children than 
eating non-irradiated food. 
Eating irradiated food will be safer for elderly persons than 
eating non-irradiated food. 
Food safety wor!Y How concerned are you about: [bacteria in foods, antibiotic .89 
Range: 1 - 7 residues in foods, food additives, pesticide residues in 
foods, naturally occurring toxins in foods, growth 
hormone residues in foods, food preservatives]? 
Attention to media 1 When you [watch television, listen to the radio, read a .78 
Range: 1 - 100 newspaper, read a magazine], how often do you 
[see/hear/read] [presentations] on food safety? 
When you [watch television, listen to the radio, read a 
newspaper, read a magazine] and come across 
[presentations] on food safety, how closely to you 
[watch/listen to/read] them? 
0Qinion LeadershiQ2 If the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approves food 
irradiation, then I can go along with it. .85 .84 
Range: 1 - 7 If the American Medical Association ..... 
If the American Dietetic Association .... 
Perceived control I have control over whether I eat irradiated foods. .72 .82 
Range: 1 - 7 The final decision about whether to eat irradiated food 
will be up to me. 
I will have the final say-so over selecting irradiated foods 
at the grocery where I shop. 
Sense of Identity Eating irradiated food is an important part of who I am. .71 .76 
Range: 1 - 7 It is important for me to eat irradiated food as part of how 
I think about myself. 
Eating irradiated food fits my lifestyle. 
Social acceQtability Most persons will be in favor of eating irradiated food. .68 .72 
Range: 1 - 7 Eating irradiated food likely will be accepted by the 
American public. 
1. All persons in the sample reported [viewing/listening to/reading] [television/radio/newspapers/ 
magazines]. The frequency of recalling media presentations on food safety (10-point 
response scale) was weighted by the amount of attention paid to the media presentation 
(10-point response scale). 
2. Each response was weighted by the degree of trust expressed (7-point response scale) in the 
organization. 
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Table II. Descriptive statistics for the model variables by time and condition. 
Variable 
Acceptance 
Perceived safety 
Food safety worry 
Attention to media 
Opinion leadership 
Perceived control 
Sense of identity 
Social acceptability 
Sex 
Age 
Income 
Education 
college) 
Mean Values Across Time and Condition 
Time 1 Time2 
No Packet-C1 Packet-C2 No Packet-C1 Packet-C2 
Range (n=113) (n=120) (n=113) (n=120) 
1 - 7 4.06 3.20a,b 4.32a,c 3.59a,b,c 
1 - 7 3.81 3.04a,b 4.04c 3.43a,b,c 
1 - 7 4.16 4.27a n/a 
1 - 100 35.24a 33.31a n/a 
1 - 7 3.05a 2.48a,b 3.27a,b,c 2.75a,b,c 
1 - 7 5.25a 4.94a 5.50a,c 4.98a,b 
1 - 7 2.41a 2.00a,b 2.39a 2.10a,c 
1 - 7 3.46a 2.89a,b 3.74a,c 3.22a,b,c 
Descriptive Statistics for the Social-Demographic Variablesd 
No Packet - C 1 
Males= 44 (38.9%) 
Females= 69 (61.1 %) 
Mean= 53.8 
Mean = 2.86 (appr. $46,500) 
Mean= 3.48 (post h.s. to college) 
Packet-C2 
Males= 44 (36.7%) 
Females= 76 (63.2%) 
Mean= 51.1 
Mean= 3.03 (appr. $50,750) 
Mean = 3.50 (post h.s. to 
a. The mean score is statistically different than the mid-point of the response scale at 
prob.< .05. 
b. The difference in mean scores between conditions (no packet and packet) within a time 
period is statistically significant at prob. < .05. 
c. The difference in mean scores between Time 1 and Time 2 within conditions is statistically 
significant at prob. < .05. 
d. There was a statistically significant difference in the number of male and female respondents; 
but this biased sex ratio was not significantly different across conditions. None of the 
differences in age, education, or income between conditions was statistically significant at 
prob.< .05. 
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Table Ill. Standardized parameter estimates and model statistics for the regression of 
acceptance on the model variables by time and condition. 
Time 1 Time2 
No Packet-C1 Packet-C2 No Packet-C1 Packet-C2 
Variable (n=113} (n=120} (n=113} (n=120} 
Age .005 .113 .086 
Sex -.065t -.009 -.018t 
Education -.059t .083 -.046t 
Income .150* -.032 .095 
Food safety worry -.144 -.055 -.065 
Attention to media .011t -.116 .000 
Perceived safety .722** .464** .657** 
Opinion leadership .084* .234* .083 
Perceived control -.015t -.090 -.068t 
Sense of identity -.007t .133 -.011t 
Social acceptability -.010t -.024 .178* 
Adjusted R-square .602 .674 .626 
F-ratio 16.41** 23.41** 18.01** 
* Parameter estimate or F-ratio is statistically significant at prob.< .05. 
** Parameter estimate or F-ratio is statistically significant at prob. < .01. 
t The sign of the parameter estimate is opposite of the sign of the bivariate correlation 
coefficient, which indicates a condition of collinearity in the model. 
-.014 
.030 
.083 
-.049 
.022 
-.007 
.571** 
.096 
-.021 
.189* 
.109 
.669 
22.85** 
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Table IV. Standardized parameter estimates and model statistics for the regression of perceived 
safety on the model variables by time and condition. 
Time 1 Time2 
No Packet-C1 Packet-C2 No Packet-C1 Packet-C2 
Variable (n=113) (n=120) (n=113) (n=120) 
Age -.020t .016 -.019t 
Sex .160* .049 .169* 
Education .152* .124* .096 
Income -.01ot -.117* -.012 
Food safety worry -.013 -.027 -.055 
Attention to media .030t -.092 -.002 
Opinion leadership .284** .425** .166 
Perceived control .141** .056 .139* 
Sense of identity .360** .338** .337** 
Social acceptability .273** .276* .296** 
Adjusted R-square .513 .749 .485 
F-ratio 12.81** 36.57** 11.58** 
* Parameter estimate or F-ratio is statistically significant at prob. < .05. 
** Parameter estimate or F-ratio is statistically significant at prob. < .01. 
t The sign of the parameter estimate is opposite of the sign of the bivariate correlation 
coefficient, which indicates a condition of collinearity in the model. 
.159* 
.071 
.137* 
-.021 
-.136* 
-.104 
.339** 
.159* 
.288** 
.246** 
.660 
24.12** 
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Table V. Standardized parameter estimates for the main effects and residualized change 
scores of the model variables on acceptance and perceived safety at Time 2 
by condition. 
Acceptance Perceived Safety 
No Packet-C1 Packet-C2 No Packet-C1 Packet-C2 
Variable (n=113) (n=120) (n=113) (n=120) 
Acceptance (Time 1) .174 .303** 
Perceived safety (Time 1) .633** .492** .531 ** .516** 
Change in perceived safety .367* .312** 
Opinion leadership (Time 1) .266** .083 .193* .131 
Change in opinion leadership .108 .116 .252** .194** 
Perceived control (Time 1) .054 -.074 .086 .078 
Change in perceived control .026 .042 .175* .154* 
Sense of identity (Time 1) -.103t .127 .118 .224* 
Change in sense of identity -.099t .227** .136 .193** 
Social acceptability (Time 1) .055 .046 .114 .086 
Change in social acceptability .039 -.015 .116 .221 ** 
Adjusted R-square .535 .677 .522 .652 
F-ratio 12.72** 23.69** 14.61** 25.81** 
* Parameter estimate or F-ratio is statistically significant at prob.< .05. 
** Parameter estimate or F-ratio is statistically significant at prob. < .01. 
t The sign of the parameter estimate is opposite of the sign of the bivariate correlation 
coefficient, which indicates a condition of collinearity in the model. 
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Chapter 4: General Conclusions 
People's opinions of complex and controversial technologies (CCT's) are themselves 
complex. This thesis examined the nature of consumer's opinions of CCT's in two research 
manuscripts. The first paper (Chapter Two) focused on factors related to consumer's 
behavioral intentions to purchase and eat genetically modified food, paying close attention 
to factors that support a technical perspective as well as a social and cultural perspective of 
risk. It was hypothesized that factors from both perspectives would be important in 
predicting consumer's opinions of CCT's. The findings supported this contention, showing 
that sociocultural factors, such as trust in public health officials, scientists, perceived social 
acceptability and perceived ethical legitimacy, along with cognitive-science factors, such as 
perceived safety, environmental safety, perceived nutritiousness, and production benefits, 
were important predictors of consumer intentions to eat biotech food. 
In the second paper, we examined consumer opinions using a longitudinal, panel design 
to measure factors predicting consumer acceptance of food irradiation. In the randomly 
assigned treatment condition, the respondents received balanced information, both for and 
against the acceptance of food irradiation, while individuals randomly assigned to the control 
condition received no information. It was hypothesized that, given the novel nature of the 
technology, individual's perceptions regarding it would change and a choice shift would 
occur in the direction of trusted opinion leaders. The results showed that opinions do 
change significantly over time, but that reported compliance with opinion leaders only partly 
explains why change occurs. Shifts in sense of identity, perceived social acceptability, and 
perceived control over the technology also were important in explaining changes in 
acceptance and perceived safety of irradiated food. 
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Risk, according to technical experts, is an objective truth that can be calculated and 
avoided (Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1979; Douglas, 1985; Bloor, 1995). Questions 
asked by risk analysts tend to focus on how accurately hazards can be calculated 
(Bradbury, 1989; Lupton, 1999). Experts, however, calculate probabilities of potential 
hazards and related consequences that have not occurred. Often the focus of those who 
assess risk is to discover ways to overcome the public's seemingly unscientific and ignorant 
reactions to risk. To better explain risk to the masses, some have focused on educating the 
public on how to better understand the probabilities associated with a potential hazard. One 
often-used example uses peanut butter and nuclear power as an example of the public as 
non-rational actors: 
Anyone with half a brain would be scared silly of a peanut butter sandwich. But 
you're not. .. you're more likely to die from the natural carcinogens in peanut butter 
than from living next to a nuclear power plant. .. when the captains of the nuclear 
industry originally offered the peanut butter equation, it didn't make them very 
popular with environmentalists and others who think we rely too heavily on half-
tamed technologies and chemicals ... When scientists bang on their calculators, they 
come up with a list of things that kill lots of people, but don't scare us much. 
(Holmes, 1997). 
Peanut butter, according to Holmes, has been identified by experts as being a higher 
risk to personal safety than is nuclear power generation, but few people define peanut butter 
as risky. On the other hand, experts claim nuclear power generation is relatively safe by 
comparison with other common hazards, but the public resists the adoption of this 
technology. Part of this discrepancy might lie in how risks are assessed. Risk can be 
assessed with regard to the likelihood of disaster or by the magnitude of a disaster if it were 
to happen. Nuclear power, to continue the example, while having a low probability of 
occurrence, has associated with it an extremely high magnitude disaster. A disaster is not 
likely, but if it does happen, it would happen on a large scale and possibly kills thousands or 
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millions. Freudenburg (1996) points out that estimates of low probability risks and high 
probability risks often can be misleading: 
Consider two technologies, one of which has been calculated to have a one-in-a-
million chance of failing, and the other of which is expected to fail several times a 
year. If risk assessors have overlooked just one minor problem in each case-say, a 
problem so obscure that it will occur only once in 12 years, as when the newest, and 
best equipped tanker owned by the largest oil company in the history of humanity ran 
straight into a reef that had been shown on navigation charts for over 200 years and 
that was marked by a flashing red light. .. that obscure risk would disappear as 
rounding error for the technology that is expected to fail several times a year, while it 
would be more important than the combined total of all the factors considered in the 
one-in-a-million estimate. (pp. 49-50). 
Thus, the safety of a technology is not necessarily a given if it is reported as such. The 
perceptions of experts, like everyone, are limited both by values, which cause one to focus 
on certain aspects of reality and ignore others, and by "blind spots," or portions of reality that 
are simply unknowns that are unknowable. A risk expert cannot assess whats/he cannot 
see or conceive of. Expert assessments of risk, therefore, may not be as 'objective' as 
some posit, and the probabilities generated can only be as accurate as the available 
knowledge about possible hazards. Additionally, some risks are simply not knowable. This 
situation, combined with the tendency for individuals and groups to perceive risks in terms of 
their relative acceptability, leads to the proposition that the perception of the public as 
irrational seems short-sighted. Are risks identified by the public based in cultural values and 
personal framing any less 'real' than expert assessment of risk? 
The dilemma of objective hazard assessment is not to say that objective hazards do not 
exist at all. Much of the scientific assessment of risk can be done fairly accurately (providing 
its limitations are observed) and can be useful to assist in well-reasoned public discourse of 
CCT's. Further, there are occasions where dangerous hazards are ignored by the public, 
while relatively safe hazards are unduly inflated in the public forum. As stated by Sandman 
(1987:21), "the risks that kill you are not necessarily the risks that anger and frighten you." 
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Risk assessments sometimes begin with an assumption that hazard estimation reflects 
reality, while public opinion only represents a skewed misperception of reality. If research 
on risk begins with assumed ideas of objectively defined risk, then findings inevitably are 
framed in this context. But risk assessment is never a value-free process, and at times, 
calculations of risk are disastrously wrong. Thus, psychometric studies of risk need to find 
alternative ways to conceptualize the cognitive processes involved rather than using 
objective risks as a basis for comparison. Perhaps rather than comparing risk perceptions 
to presumed risk reality, factors that affect risk development, such as information effects, 
perceived safety, perceived benefits, and social factors such as trust, values, or social 
acceptance, could be incorporated into risk assessment, management, and communication. 
Some theoretical models have been developed that predict changes and directionality in 
the attitudes of individuals without placing value on the change. Polarization theory (or 
choice shift) (e.g., Stoner, 1961; Wallach, Kogan & Bern, 1962; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; 
Myers & Lamm, 1976. See also chapter 1 }, for example, posits that the mean of individual 
attitudes will shift after communicative interaction with group members in the direction of a 
valued group norm, based on social comparison (Sanders & Baron, 1977; Codol, 1975), the 
effects of persuasive information exchanged in the interaction (Vinokur & Burnstein, 197 4; 
Ebbesen & Bowers, 1974), or attempts to identify with a perceived prototypical normative 
group member (Turner, 1987; Mackie & Cooper, 1984; Mackie, 1986; Abrams et al., 1990; 
Turner et al., 1989). The findings in Chapter 3 support the proposition that acceptance and 
perceived safety will change. But the nature of the research design precluded identifying 
whether change occurred through any of the interaction processes suggested by the various 
forms of polarization theory. 
Rogers' (1995) diffusion of innovation theory identifies factors that influence the adoption 
of an innovation technology, such as relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability 
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and observability. Opinion leaders, persons who have the ability to influence the opinions of 
others regarding the innovation, are crucial to the diffusion of the technology. The results of 
research reported in Chapter 3 found some support for the proposition that choice shift 
occurs due to compliance with viewpoints held by opinion leaders. 
The examination of consumer opinions and attitudes relating to the acceptance or 
rejection of complex and controversial technologies is not only timely and important to 
proponents of a technological innovation, but is important to the advancement of the social 
sciences. Further research is needed to more directly test theories that were implicitly 
tested in this thesis. While our hypothesis regarding the expected directionality of choice 
shift was supported by the data, a more direct study of the effects of polarization on 
consumer attitudes would be valuable. Similarly, while the data generally supported the 
hypothesis that when consumer beliefs polarized, they would do so in the direction of trusted 
opinion leaders, it would be valuable to examine in more depth the efficacy of the 
innovation-decision process of diffusion theory. 
This thesis examined consumer opinions regarding complex and controversial 
technologies, the factors related to these attitudes and opinions, and theories that might 
help explain the acceptance or rejection of these technologies. Evidence was found to 
support a multifaceted view of risk theory, demonstrating the importance of both cognitive-
science and sociocultural factors in predicting consumer behavioral intentions to purchase 
and eat biotech foods. Further, the data support, indirectly, hypotheses of directionality 
stating that over time consumer attitudes regarding food irradiation will polarize (generally) 
in the direction of trusted opinion leaders. 
Complex and controversial technological innovations often are seen as risky by a public 
who must live in a time where they are dissociated from the technology they use. 
Individuals must learn whom to trust. Therefore perceived safety and trust become of 
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central importance to consumers who are attempting to decide if they wish to adopt the 
technology. Experts must recognize the responsibility they carry; legitimacy is difficult to 
gain and is easily lost. Failure to appreciate this responsibility can result not only in the 
rejection of innovations, but also engender a culture where the public is unable to distinguish 
between truth and deception. 
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